Situational Update

• Axios’s Barak Ravid reports: President Biden’s envoy Amos Hochstein said on Tuesday in Beirut that Lebanon and Israel have reached “a moment of decision-making” regarding a ceasefire agreement. The draft agreement includes a ceasefire and 60-day transition period — during which the Israeli military would withdraw from southern Lebanon, the Lebanese army would deploy in areas close to the border and Hezbollah would move its heavy weapons north of the Litani River.
• AIPAC and Times of Israel report: Hezbollah’s media chief Mohammad Afif, who claimed responsibility for targeting Prime Minister Netanyahu’s home in the terror group’s drone attack last month, was reportedly eliminated in a strike in central Beirut.
• The WSJ reports: Israel Finds Large Troves of Russian Arms in Hezbollah’s Hands: As Israel advances its invasion of southern Lebanon, its troops are finding large troves of Russian weapons, confirming longstanding suspicions in Israel that Hezbollah is enhancing its fighting capacity with the help of sophisticated Russian arms.
• The Times of Israel reports: The US imposes sanctions on six senior Hamas officials, the US Treasury Department says, adding that the sanctions target the group’s representatives abroad, a senior member of the Hamas military wing and those involved in supporting fundraising efforts for the group and weapons smuggling into Gaza. Among those targeted are Abd al-Rahman Ismail abd al-Rahman Ghanimat, a longtime member of Hamas’s military wing who is now based in Turkey

The Numbers

• 1,789 Israelis have been killed including 799 IDF soldiers since October 7th (+4 IDF soldiers and +1 civilian since Sunday)
• The South: 376 IDF soldiers during the ground operation in Gaza have been killed (+3 since Wednesday)
• The North: 120 Israelis (75 IDF soldiers; +1 IDF soldier and +1 civilian since Sunday) have been killed during the war in Northern Israel

  

  • Sergeant First Class (res.) Idan Kenan (21), Captain Yogev Pazy (22) and Staff Sergeant Noam Eitan (21) (above) were killed in northern Gaza
    • March Schulman writes: While every loss is profoundly tragic, the death of Captain Yogev Pazy is especially heartbreaking. Pazy is the son of former Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot’s sister-in-law. Eizenkot has now endured the unimaginable pain of losing a son and two nephews in this conflict
  • Sergeant First Class (res.) Omer Moshe Gealdor (below) was killed during an operation in Southern Lebanon, when Hezbollah targeted his unit with a suicide drone

    

  • Safaa Awad, 41, a teacher, and at least 17 people were wounded in several rocket barrages fired by Hezbollah on Monday, as the terror group launched more than 100 rockets, landing in the northern Arab town of Shfar’am in northern Israel.
• Additional Information (according to the IDF):
  • 2,440 (+7 since Sunday) IDF soldiers have been injured during ground combat in Gaza, including at least 461 (+1 since Sunday) who have been severely injured.
  • 5,381 (+50 since Sunday) IDF soldiers have been injured since the beginning of the war, including at least 786 (+5 since Sunday) who have been severely injured.

• According to unverified figures from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Health Ministry, 43,992 (+186since Sunday) people have been killed in Gaza, and 103,898 (+528 since last Sunday) have been injured during the war.
  • On October 7th, Ohad Hemo with Channel 12 Israel News – the country’s largest news network, a leading expert on Palestinian and Arab affairs, mentioned an estimate from Hamas: around 80% of those killed in Gaza are members of the organization and their families.”
    • The article goes on to say: “In an N12 article that came out this morning, Hemo also pointed out that since the elimination of key leader Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s top echelon has gone underground and fled Iran and Lebanon, with some relocating to Turkey and Qatar – with the hope that Israel will not strike them there.
  • Read this well documented piece from Tablet published in March: How the Gaza Ministry of Health Fakes Casualty Numbers
  • The Associated Press, an outlet with a demonstrated anti-Israel bias, conducted an analysis of alleged Gaza death tolls released by the Hamas-controlled “Gaza Health Ministry.” The analysis found that “9,940 of the dead – 29% of its April 30 total – were not listed in the data” and that “an additional 1,699 records in the ministry’s April data were incomplete and 22 were duplicates.”
• The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes official details on every civilian and IDF casualty.

Hostages (no change)

Watch this powerful video of a former hostage captured by Hamas, Moran Stella Yanai, speaking truth at a panel with an anti-Israel activist.

• There are currently 97 hostages taken on 10/7 currently in captivity in Gaza
• 7 hostages are Americans: Meet the Seven American Hostages Still Held By Hamas
• On October 7^th, a total of 261 Israelis were taken hostage.
• During the ceasefire deal in November, 112 hostages were released.
• 146 hostages in total have been released or rescued
  • The bodies of 37 hostages have been recovered, including 3 mistakenly killed by the military as they tried to escape their captors.
• 8 hostages have been rescued by troops alive
• This leaves 101 hostages still theoretically in Gaza
  • 30-50 hostages are assumed to be dead and held in captivity
  • Thus, at most, 50-70 living hostages could still be in Gaza.
• Hamas is also holding 2 Israeli civilians who entered the Strip in 2014 and 2015, as well as the bodies of 2 IDF soldiers who were killed in 2014.

Listen

[PODCAST] Call Me Back with Dan Senor: How Vanderbilt University is getting it right – with Chancellor Diermeier

• In our conversation, which was recorded on campus, Chancellor Diermeier discusses how the university has developed its policies around free speech, institutional neutrality, and campus order. In the face of staggering levels of intolerance — not to mention pro-Hamas protests effectively taking over some campuses — has Vanderbilt become a model for how to get it right?

Watch

Shabbos Kestenbaum posts on X: Harvard students yelled “Zionists are not welcomed here” outside the Harvard Hillel as Jewish students were entering.

Rocket Alerts

According to AIPAC: This November alone, more than 750 rockets, missiles and drones have been launched into Israel from Lebanon — an average of more than 40 per day.

Marc Schulman reports: A single ballistic missile was launched from Lebanon. Although the missile was intercepted at high altitude over the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, it was not completely destroyed. A substantial portion of the missile landed in Ramat Gan, igniting fires and causing substantial damage to homes, businesses, an electric line, and a parked bus. Glass and debris from nearby skyscrapers rained down, adding to the chaos. Five people were injured, one seriously.

Yesterday, there were 277 red alerts, and a total of 1,088 in the past week

• +387 rocket alerts since Sunday
• +85 UAV alerts since last Sunday

Source: Rocket Alerts in Israel

Humanitarian Aid

• Nearly 100 trucks carrying food for Palestinians were violently looted on November 16 after entering Gaza in one of the worst aid losses during 13 months of war in the enclave, where hunger is deepening, two UN agencies told Reuters on Monday.
• Ninety-eight of the 109 trucks in the convoy were raided and some of the transporters were injured during the incident
• UN spokesman Stephane Dujarric said there was “severe damage to the trucks and in some cases, total loss of cargo on the trucks,” calling the incident the worst instance of looting in Gaza “in terms of volume.”
• UN Spokesperson regarding the stealing of humanitarian aid in Gaza: “When armed people try to take control of a vehicle and goods, we’re not asking questions.”

What We Are Reading

Documents found in Gaza detail Iranian sponsorship ahead of Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack: Iran provided advance funding for a 2023 war between Hamas and Israel, Hamas planned joint “infiltration actions” with Hezbollah, according to a report published by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. By Lahar Harkov in The Jewish Insider

• Iran was an essential part of Hamas’ preparations for the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel, according to a report released by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center on Sunday, based on documents found by the IDF in Gaza over the last year.
• On December 18, 2022, a letter from Marwan Issa, the deputy commander of Hamas’ Qassam Brigades who was killed in March of this year, wrote to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar — also killed by the IDF this year — that Iran agreed to provide a special budget of $7 million per month for a year to prepare for a war with Israel, but Issa thought Hamas should ask for a three- or four-month advance so that the group could prepare faster.
• The letter also states that the sides discussed ways of smuggling weapons from Yemen to Hamas through “a network of smugglers that he totally trusts,”
• Iran also trained Hamas terrorists to use drones in the years preceding the Oct. 7 attack. The terrorists were smuggled to Iran via Turkey for advanced training in 2019, according to another document.
• Multiple documents indicated that Iran had specific instructions for how the money it sent to Hamas was to be used, though Issa wrote a letter in 2021 complaining about money that disappeared in transit. In the Meir Amit Center’s evaluation, “Hamas leadership probably kept some of the Iranian money for its own pockets or purposes.”
• Iran used its financial leverage on Hamas to influence its decision-making. Former Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh wrote to Sinwar in 2022 to inform him that Iran will reinstate its funding to Hamas, after the latter agreed to reestablish relations with Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime. Hamas had previously supported Syrian rebels against Assad.
• Iran also sought to influence Gazan civilians, the majority of whom are Sunni Muslims, in a process the report called “Shi’ization.” Iran-sponsored activities included celebrations of “Quds Day,” a holiday invented by the mullahs’ regime centered on incitement against Israel. The regime held contests for “media projects to strengthen the stability” of Iran’s proxies. Iran paid about $120,000 per month to support Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad radio stations, sponsored scholarships named for terrorists and provided students with free school supplies, along with information about the IRGC’s Quds force and other elements of Tehran’s “axis of resistance.”
• Link: Documents found in Gaza detail Iranian sponsorship ahead of Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack
• Read the full report here from The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

Iran Is Much Weaker Than the Last Time It Faced Trump, by Dr. Hal Brands with Bloomberg

• The Middle East has long been a source of misery for Washington. It could be a land of opportunity for Donald Trump.
• In his first term as president, Trump brokered diplomatic détentes between Israel and several Arab states. In his second, he’ll encounter a region in which Israeli military successes have dramatically reset the balance of power. That creates the possibility for a bold play to roll back Iran’s influence and curb its nuclear program — if Trump can avoid stumbling into another Middle Eastern mess.
• And President Joe Biden deserves some credit here. Yes, Biden has often urged caution on Israel and his relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is toxic. Still, Biden has given Israel the arms, the diplomatic assistance and the time necessary to take the offensive. The idea that Israel defends itself by itself is a myth: Several times, US forces have even fought directly on its behalf (by shooting down drones and missiles). Since the Hamas invasion on Oct. 7, 2023, US-Israel relations have been both deeply dysfunctional and devastatingly effective. What will Trump make of this inheritance?
• He appears to have forgiven Netanyahu for acknowledging Biden’s victory in 2020; he surely admires Israel’s recent shows of strength. That provides an opening — and reports that Iran allegedly tried to assassinate Trump this fall provides extra motive — to further reset the region by squeezing its most malevolent regime.
• Trump will likely renew his “maximum pressure” campaign to starve Iran of resources. The US might simultaneously take sharper military action against Yemen’s Houthis, still wreaking havoc on Red Sea shipping.
• First, Trump must determine what he wants. In his first term, he never decided whether the goal was to change Iranian policy or change the Iranian regime. Given Tehran’s weakness, the former objective may now be feasible. The latter, probably, is not.
• Second, Trump must bring ambivalent Gulf states onboard. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates loathe Iran but fear conflict in their backyard. Trump will have to prove that the US won’t simply abandon them when tensions spiral, as he did when Iran attacked Saudi Arabian oil facilities in 2019.
• Third, Washington must mind the oil markets. Pressing Iran means removing from global markets most of the 1.7 million barrels per day it exports. Unless Trump relaxes sanctions against the likes of Russia and Venezuela, he’ll have to expand domestic production while bringing the Saudis and their spare capacity along.
• Fourth, Trump can’t avoid grappling with Gaza. Saudi Arabia won’t normalize ties with Israel until the war there ends (and, perhaps, Israel at least gestures at the creation of a Palestinian state). Trump may hope that stronger US backing will end the war through Israeli victory. If that fails, Trump’s support for Israel and his desire to close a Saudi deal could be at odds. And if the Israeli government goes ahead with a far-right plan to formally annex the West Bank, the regional diplomatic climate will change for the worse.
• Link: Iran Is Much Weaker Than the Last Time It Faced Trump

Israel’s expanding efforts to disrupt Hezbollah’s supply chain, by Emanuele Ottolenghi and Joe Truzman with FDD

• In recent years, Iran steadily built up Hezbollah’s arsenal in Lebanon and Syria by shipping weapons, flying them in, and transporting them by truck. Weapons consignments arrived at ports and airports and were stored at warehouses in both countries before being distributed to Hezbollah units. Israel has sought to disrupt the flow of weapons, chiefly by bombing raids on targets in Syria (including the port of Latakia and the airport in Damascus). Since Hezbollah joined Hamas and opened a second front against Israel on October 8, 2023, Israel has hit targets in Lebanon as well. But Israel’s efforts to degrade and destroy Hezbollah’s arsenal and disrupt Iran’s efforts to resupply it have dramatically increased in tempo since September 28, the day after Israel eliminated Hezbollah’s late leader, Hassan Nasrallah.
• On that day, Israel interdicted an Iranian cargo plane as it made its final descent into Beirut airport, forcing it to return to Tehran. Following the interdiction, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Spokesperson Daniel Hagari warned that the Israeli military would prohibit Iranian weapon transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The IDF put Hagari’s words into action as Israeli interdictions occurred twice more before October 5, when Iranian cargo was permanently diverted to Latakia in Syria.
• Supplies are now landing by plane in Latakia and reaching its Syrian port by cargo ship from Iran, with Israel making no attempts so far to disrupt the air traffic. Flight tracking data available from the commercial website FlightRadar24 show that, since September 28, when a cargo aircraft operated by the US-sanctioned, IRGC-controlled Qeshm Fars Air sought to land in Beirut, the same cargo plane flew four times to Latakia. Aircraft operated by Mahan Air and Yazd Airways—both A310 and A342 Airbus passenger planes—have flown to Latakia at least 17 times since September 28. Nevertheless, once an aircraft lands in Syria, the goods it carries have an additional hurdle to overcome—supplies must then safely travel to Lebanon.
• On October 25, 2024, Israeli jets targeted Hezbollah infrastructure at the Syrian-controlled Jusiyah Border Crossing in the northern Beqaa Valley. This location had been utilized by Unit 4400 to smuggle weapons into Lebanon. According to the IDF, the strike was part of a series of attacks that month aimed at border crossings that Unit 4400 was exploiting along the Syria-Lebanon frontier.
• In the pre-dawn hours of November 1, 25 Israeli naval commandos quietly approached the shore of the northern Lebanese town of Batrun, more than 100 miles north of the Israel-Lebanon border. The moonless night was perfect for a raid. After the commandos landed on the beach, they were already on their way out with their target safely in custody within minutes. The prisoner was Imad Fadel Amhaz, a 38-year-old officer in Lebanon’s navy and a trained pilot. The commandos seized his electronics and 10 SIM cards from foreign mobile phone operators as well.
• The Israelis were clearly looking for intelligence. Hezbollah’s naval unit may be small and has seen little action over the years, but size and quality are not the same. Equipped with Russian-made Yakhont missiles, the naval unit can inflict serious harm to Israeli maritime forces. It did so in 2006, during the previous Israel-Hezbollah war, when Chinese-made C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles hit an Israeli frigate, crippling the boat and killing four crew.
• Which brings us to Amhaz. Since his capture, the Hezbollah propaganda machine has been assiduously denying he had any official role in the terrorist group. Alongside Lebanon’s Hezbollah-appointed minister of transport, Ali Hamie, who insisted that Amhaz was a civilian naval officer, Amhaz’s family members reported the same to Lebanese media. The Israelis, in contrast, have been mum, other than confirming the raid and identifying Amhaz as a key member of Hezbollah’s naval unit.
• The evidence that has emerged is quite convincing that Iran is exploiting maritime routes to conceal weapons shipments to Hezbollah, and the port of Latakia has become a critical part of this strategy. It should not come as a surprise. Hezbollah has also been using Latakia as a logistics hub for fenethylline shipments, and what moves illegal drugs can also move weapons.
• One scheme involves Iran attempting to evade Israeli intelligence by using European sea ports to mask weapons shipments, which are subsequently ferried to Latakia before being transported to Lebanon, The Telegraph reported.
• Baniyas is a hub for oil imports, with Iranian vessels frequently docking there. In recent years, Israel has conducted airstrikes at the port, reportedly aimed at weapons transfers and Iranian military personnel. On July 9, Syrian state-controlled media reported IDF airstrikes near Baniyas that “caused some material losses.” The attacks are yet another indication of the ongoing confrontations between Israel, Iran, and Hezbollah over these critical maritime routes.
• It’s clear that Iran and its partners in the region are using every method available to them to transfer illicit weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This strategy has been successful. Despite Israel’s efforts to interdict the transfer of these arms, the current conflict in Lebanon demonstrates that advanced weapons have still reached Hezbollah. Furthermore, Hezbollah has not been shy about showing off some of the arsenals it has received from its patron in Tehran. Ballistic missiles, anti-air defense systems, and drones are just some of the arms displayed by the group.
• Link: Analysis: Israel’s expanding efforts to disrupt Hezbollah’s supply chain

Can the War in Gaza Be Won?, by Noura Erakat, Josh Paul, Charles O. Blaha, and Luigi Daniele; John Spencer in Foreign Affairs

There is no Victory in Gaza

• The current war in Gaza is not an isolated conflict that began on October 7, 2023, when Hamas militants launched an attack inside Israel. Framing the war this way, as John Spencer does in a recent article in Foreign Affairs (“Israel Is Winning,” August 21, 2024), invites many dubious assertions about Israel’s purported progress toward its war aims and its supposed efforts to protect civilians. And it accepts without question the Israeli government’s official position that “Israel is fighting Hamas terrorists, not the Palestinian population,” as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared in a speech in January. To simplify the conflict to a fight between Israel and Hamas is to ignore the on-the-ground realities that indicate Israel is waging an indiscriminate war on all Palestinians.
• A more accurate understanding of the war must take its broader context into account. What is happening now in Gaza is one battle within the larger conflict that has shaped the Israeli-Palestinian relationship since the founding of Israel and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the new state’s territory in 1948. Today’s fight cannot be removed from that history and geography; gaining the upper hand in the current battle is not the same as winning the wider war. Spencer falls into this trap, miscasting Israel’s temporary tactical achievements as strategic victory and underestimating how Israel’s unwillingness to pursue a political resolution that recognizes the Palestinians’ right to self-determination will in the end diminish its chances of success.
• In the war Spencer describes, Israel has three aims: “to recover all hostages, secure its borders, and destroy Hamas.” To win such a war, Israel would have had to focus on taking out Hamas’s military and governing capabilities. One might expect Israeli forces to launch precise strikes on Hamas military targets while Israeli diplomats lead an effort to isolate Hamas politically. Instead, Israel has conducted a campaign of broad devastation in Gaza, attacking the territory’s civilian population; demolishing its health, educational, and social infrastructure; and destroying its food production, shelter, and sources of potable water. There is a disconnect between these indiscriminate tactics and the discrete goals that Spencer identifies.
• Israel’s actions suggest that its true goal is to terminate Palestinian aspirations for self-determination. As the fighting rages in Gaza, members of Israel’s far-right government, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, have vowed to resettle the territory with Jewish Israelis. The minister of national security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, has cleared the way for Israeli settlers to rampage through Palestinian villages across the West Bank. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself has denied any possibility of Palestinian statehood, signaling that there is no Palestinian future, with or without Hamas. The Basic Law passed in 2018 by the Israeli legislature made this much clear, affirming that only Jews have a right to self-determination in the territory that includes the West Bank and Gaza. Most recently, the Knesset’s ban on the UN Palestinian refugee agency UNRWA’s operations in the West Bank and Gaza not only ensures a deepening humanitarian crisis but also aims to delegitimize Palestinians’ refugee status and claims to their original homes and lands. Although it insists otherwise, the Israeli government has demonstrated over the past year that its ultimate target is not Hamas but the Palestinian will to resist occupation and subjugation. It is, in effect, applying a military solution to a political problem. Far from moving toward victory, Israel is becoming less secure in the region, less stable at home, and less likely to find a durable solution with the Palestinians.
• It is true that Israel’s border with Gaza is more secure now than it was before the war, but that is only because the military operation inside Gaza is keeping a lid on cross-border threats. The underlying tensions connected to Israel’s pre–October 7 blockade of Gaza—the very tensions that fueled Hamas’s initial attack—have not been addressed. Limits on trade and humanitarian assistance entering (or leaving) Gaza are far stricter than they were before, and there is still no clear path to granting Palestinians self-determination and other political rights. Even now, Hamas militants have reemerged and attacked Israeli forces in parts of Gaza that the Israeli military had supposedly secured, and the group continues to launch rockets into Israel. As Spencer notes, Hamas has pledged to attack any other foreign security force that comes into Gaza. Thus, to hold its temporary gains, Israel appears stuck in a counterinsurgency campaign for the foreseeable future.

Spencer Replies

• The current war between Israel and Hamas, the governing authority of Gaza and an internationally designated terrorist group, is one such example of a discrete war within a wider conflict. This war started on October 7, 2023, when Hamas militants led an invasion into sovereign Israeli territory and proceeded to murder, rape, mutilate, vandalize, and commit other inhumane acts. That was the triggering event; the underlying problems include a complex history over land ownership, sovereignty, and rights, as well as Hamas’s radical belief that Israel should not exist.
• But there was no justification for Hamas’s actions. The day before, a cease-fire had been in place between Hamas and Israel. Hamas had agreed to the truce in May 2021 after an 11-day Israeli air campaign in Gaza that followed Hamas’s firing of 150 rockets into Israel, an opening barrage that killed two Israeli civilians and wounded dozens more. Nearly two and a half years later, Hamas broke that cease-fire.
• I have visited Gaza three times since October 7. My analysis of the war is based on what I saw, not on Israeli statements, Hamas’s statements, or videos on social media. I observed both IDF operations and Hamas activities in Gaza firsthand. I witnessed the IDF taking extraordinary steps to mitigate civilian harm and imposing restraints on the use of force as it undertook what may be the greatest urban warfare challenge in modern history. I saw the IDF tracking the movement of civilians and handing out maps to facilitate localized evacuations, pausing the fighting every day for hours at a time to allow civilians to get out of harm’s way and humanitarian aid to be delivered, and in many cases not permitting operations in areas where civilians were present. I also saw Hamas’s cruel use of Gazans as human shields; the tunnels the group built under civilian homes, mosques, and schools; and the militants’ complete lack of care for civilian life.
• For observers to project their own values and interests onto Hamas and its supporters is to fall into a dangerous trap. Hamas did not say it conducted the October 7 attacks to advance self-determination, human rights, or prosperity for the Palestinian people. The group’s stated goal was to destroy the nation of Israel and kill all the Jewish people within it, and none of its actions since suggest it has other objectives in mind. As one Hamas official said shortly after October 7, the group intends to continue carrying out attacks until it achieves its ultimate goal.
• Basing an argument on these figures is also problematic considering that the civilian casualty numbers released by the Hamas-led Gaza Health Ministry are unverified and, according to some reports, statistically and methodologically unreliable. But even if the numbers were accurate, they could not provide conclusive evidence that Israeli forces broke the law by launching indiscriminate attacks or intentional attacks on civilians. Making such a case would require information about Israeli intelligence on concrete military targets, what Israeli forces knew about the presence of civilians before military actions began, how it made decisions to use certain weapons or tactics, and the precautions it took to reduce civilian harm.
• Hamas has been subjugating the Palestinian people in Gaza since it seized power in 2007. It started attacking Israel in 2008, and it is now the single greatest obstacle to a Palestinian government that would seek coexistence with Israel. In October 2023, Hamas started a war, and it is losing that war. The only way to break the cycle of violence and radicalization in Gaza is for Israel to continue, through legal and methodical means, to remove Hamas from military and political power.
• Link: Can the War in Gaza Be Won?

Don’t Assume Iran’s Retaliation Will Target Only Israel, by Shay Khatiri in Middle East Forum

• In the aftermath of the Israeli strikes, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and top regime officials announced that Iran would respond. Too many diplomats assume that Iranian retaliation will mean a third direct strike on Israel. Perhaps it will. Rhetoric from Iranian officials, however, suggests Iran’s retaliation could go further. “The enemies, whether Israel or the United States of America, … will receive a devastating response,” Khamenei declared. Hossein Salami, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, likewise lumped the United States and Israel together in a recent speech. Citing the campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon, he said, “The Americans and Israelis are arriving at their sunset, and in due time we will respond to them.”
• Khamenei finds himself between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, his domestic support base demands he respond to the Israeli attack. On the other, his attacks on Israel have backfired. Not only did they fail to damage Israel significantly, but Israel’s retaliation also degraded Iran’s military. A third round of attacks on Israel would not likely succeed but would invite more Israeli attacks and degrade Iranian targets further.
• Reportedly, Iranian intermediaries in Iraq warned the U.S. military in advance to allow the U.S. military time to shelter American personnel from Iraq’s Al-Assad Airbase. Javad Zarif, then Iran’s foreign minister and now the strategic adviser to the president, tweeted, “Iran took & concluded proportionate measures in self-defense under Article 51 of UN Charter targeting base from which cowardly armed attack against our citizens & senior officials were launched. We do not seek escalation or war, but will defend ourselves against any aggression.” He sought an off-ramp to save face while preventing a response. Then, as now, the attack occurred after a U.S. presidential election during the sitting president’s lame duck period. As Trump cited his refusal to engage the U.S. in new Middle Eastern wars as a pillar of his legacy, Khamenei and Zarif calculated Iran could get away with a direct strike on Americans. Biden is similar. He, too, brags that he is “the first president in this century to report to the American people that the United States is not at war anywhere in the world.”
• Get ready for missile theater. If Iran attacks U.S. forces in Bahrain, for example, Khamenei could seek to incite the island nation’s majority Shi’ite population, punish Bahrain for joining the Abraham Accords, and remind Trump of the hundreds of Americans permanently stationed at the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters on the island. Similar attacks could target U.S. forces in northeastern Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan, or Saudi Arabia.
• Too often, American analysts waive off adversaries’ militant statements as rhetorical flourishes. Khamenei, however, means what he says. He often talks about “the enemy.” By naming the United States alongside Israel as his top “enemies”—he rarely uses the plural form—he may be preparing his audience for an attack against U.S. forces. The United States must stop believing they can be bystanders to Iranian aggression, especially when Khamenei believes the U.S. is weak or self-deterring.
• Link: Don’t Assume Iran’s Retaliation Will Target Only Israel

Antisemitism

StopAntisemitism conducted its annual report, evaluating 25 U.S. universities on their commitment to protecting Jewish students. Although many universities include Jewish students in DEI initiatives, hatred against them has surged in the wake of 10/7. What once were prestigious institutions, trusted by Jewish families, have now become breeding grounds for some of the most dangerous expressions of hatred directed at Jews.

• 55% of Jewish students have personally been victims of antisemitism at their schools.
• 43% did not feel safe enough to report the incidents. Of those who did report, a staggering 87% believe their school failed to properly investigate
• 43% hide their Jewish identity from their classmates out of fear
• 72% feel unwelcome in certain spaces on campus simply for being Jewish.
• 67% say Jews are completely excluded from their school’s DEI initiatives.
• 69% are blamed for the actions of Israel—actions they have no control over.
• 67% feel their university did not take sufficient action to protect Jewish students in the wake of the 10/7 massacre.
• And perhaps most heartbreaking: 43% would not recommend their school to fellow Jewish students
• Since the release of our 2023 report, StopAntisemitism has been flooded with firsthand accounts from Jewish students, families, and even some faculty, all detailing a surge in antisemitic harassment, threats, and exclusion on campuses nationwide. The numbers this year speak volumes, showing an overwhelming rise in antisemitic incidents following the October 7 massacre—a 3,000% increase in tips and submissions from Jewish students across the country. This disturbing trend makes it clear: Universities are failing their Jewish students, often leaving them vulnerable and unsupported.
• Recommendations Include:
  • Adopt the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism for assessing matters of antisemitism on campus. The Federal Government requires that universities adopt IHRA to be eligible for Title VI funding, and administrators who flout its prescriptions should be held accountable
  • Include Jews in all DEI policies, including the formation of an affinity group.
  • Demand the suspension and expulsion of Students for Justice in Palestine for their persistent harassment, bullying, and acts of violence against Jewish students, especially following the October 7th massacre.
  • Call for the suspension and expulsion of Faculty for Justice in Palestine, a group actively working to silence and marginalize Jewish voices on campus and suppress the rights of Jewish students and colleagues
  • A new report from AMCHA Initiative exposes the alarming influence of Faculty for Justice in Palestine (FJP) in escalating anti-Israel unrest and antisemitism on U.S. campuses. FJP chapters, present at 55% of top schools for Jewish students, actively coordinate with anti-Zionist organizations, prolonging protests by 2.5 times and amplifying violence targeting Jews. Campuses with FJP chapters report 7.3 times more physical violence against Jewish individuals and 3.4 times more death threats.
• Link to Full Report: StopAntisemitism-College-Report

Being a Jew in Public by Rabbi Strauss, senior rabbi of Congregation Beth Yeshurun (my Rabbi here in Houston!!) in Time

• A Jewish man wearing a yarmulke was shot multiple times on his way to synagogue in Chicago. A rabbi in Maryland was attacked by a man wielding a wooden stake. In Manhattan, a man wearing a yarmulke was called “dirty Jew” before being punched in the face. Each of these assaults occurred within a two-week span last month.
• Yet the rising fear around visible Jewish identity is hard to ignore. I’ve worn a yarmulke all 24 years I’ve been a rabbi here, but recently found myself removing it in certain public settings. It’s not that I felt an immediate threat to my safety as I entered a local café or as I walked around town, but I felt enough wariness about how it would be received that I tucked it in my pocket until I knew I was in a safe location. For the first time in my life, I even felt the need for a security escort on my walk home from Yom Kippur services this year.
• Beyond Houston, Jews are being identified and targeted simply for who they are. In May, two Orthodox Jewish children were assaulted in Brooklyn. In September, a man in Michigan told police he was beaten after his assailant asked him if he was Jewish. One month prior, Jewish students wearing yarmulkes at the University of Pittsburgh were attacked only a few miles from the Tree of Life synagogue, the site where 11 worshippers were murdered in the deadliest antisemitic attack in U.S. history.
• In Texas, Gov. Greg Abbott’s Administration is providing resources and implementing programs that foster education and resilience against hate.
• The fight against antisemitism is not just a Jewish cause; it’s an American cause. Left unchecked, antisemitism is a disease that undermines the moral fabric of our communities and compromises the safety and well-being of all Americans. This is why preventive measures and policies are essential, not just to protect Jewish lives but to safeguard the inclusive values we hold dear as a nation.
• Link: Jews Shouldn’t Have to Hide Symbols of Their Identity

America’s Words and Amsterdam’s Example by Meir Y. Soloveichik with Commentary Magazine

• Since the time of Tocqueville, Americans have been best able to understand themselves through the eyes of an insightful outsider. It should therefore be no surprise that the best summation of the lessons of the 2024 election came not from an American pundit but from a farsighted foreigner. On the morning of November 6, Konstantin Kisin, a British intellectual born in Russia, penned a list of 10 reflections regarding the results of November 5, 2024. The reflections are all the more interesting because America is not his intended audience. As Kisin tells us, his thoughts are mainly for “my British and European friends who are ‘shocked’ and ‘surprised’” and who “didn’t see it coming.”
• All 10 comments are worth reading, but several stick out. Thus there is, for example, Kisin’s reflection on wealth creation in the United States:
  • Americans do not believe in socialism. They believe in meritocracy. They don’t care about the super rich being super rich because they know that they live in a country where being super rich is available to anyone with the talent and drive to make it. They don’t resent success, they celebrate it.
• Most important of all is his reflection regarding the impact of the Gaza conflict on the American electorate. All indications are that unstinting oratorical support for Israel and its war only helped the ultimate victors in the election. Exit polls reveal that around two-thirds of voters agree with American support for its ally, with many of those voters asserting that the administration was not supporting Israel enough. Kisin was raised Christian but is partially of Jewish descent, and his words ought to be taught in civics class in Jewish day schools across America: “Americans are the most philosemitic nation on earth. October 7 and the pro-Hamas left’s reaction shocked them to their very core because, among other things, they remember what 9/11 was like and they know jihad when they see it.”
• Kisin is exactly right, and another insightful outsider allows us to understand why philo-Semitism in America is so profound. Rabbi Jonathan Sacks recounted how, as a college student, he visited Washington for the first time and was struck by the fact that the memorials for great American figures featured not only images but words as well. The Jefferson Memorial, for example, features not only a statue of the author of the Declaration of Independence but also the words of the document that changed the world. David Chester French’s memorial for Lincoln houses not only the statue of an enthroned president but also the chiseled texts of the Gettysburg Address and the Second Inaugural. In contrast, Sacks continued, the statue in Westminster of Churchill—for whom words were somewhat important—contains only a single word: “Churchill.”
• It bears remembering that America was not the first nation to be inspired by the Jews. As I write these words, the Internet is filled with videos of an anti-Semitic pogrom in Amsterdam. The images ought to be haunting and horrific to anyone, but they are particularly so for those who understand what Amsterdam once meant to Jewish history.
• Before America, there was Amsterdam. But it was not in the Netherlands that Jews found full equality; that would come only in the country that would place human equality at the core of its creed and consider itself covenantal in seeking to further this vision. That is why Kisin is correct in understanding the philo-Semitism that is still to be found in the American electorate. It is rooted in the fact that, as Sacks put it, “Israel, ancient and modern, and the United States are the two supreme examples of societies constructed in conscious pursuit of an idea.”
• What happened in Amsterdam is, of course, a warning for America, for it is, alas, not difficult to imagine a similar mob made manifest on an Ivy League college quad or on the streets of Los Angeles or New York. Nevertheless, at the end of an eventful first week in November, one truth is quite clear. The commonality between America and Israel—and the bond built upon it—endures. And surely, whatever one’s views on the many policy questions facing this country in this season of Thanksgiving, that is a reason for gratitude.

Link: America’s Words and Amsterdam’s Example

J Street and Bernie Sanders are Playing a Dangerous Game with Jewish Lives by David-Seth Kirshner in The Times of Israel

• J Street’s dangerous political stunt comes hours after scores of Hezbollah missiles rained down on the only Jewish state, murdering an Israeli woman and injuring dozens more civilians. It comes as young Israeli women and men search frantically for Israeli hostages taken more than 410 days ago to Gaza, and brave IDF soldiers work to degrade the terrorists’ capabilities deliberately embedded within civilian enclaves.
• These weapons for Israel – essential to defend and confront enemies on all sides – were approved by the Biden administration just months ago to “improve Israel’s capability to meet current and future enemy threats, strengthen its homeland defense, and serve as a deterrent to regional threats.” The equipment in question is vital as the IDF fights to deter future attacks, destroy the massive weapons arsenals of terrorist groups on its borders, and protect millions of Israelis in the crosshairs of the Iranian regime.
• J Street’s justification for this anti-Israel campaign is that the votes will fail, and the arms sales will go through, regardless of what they do.
• In essence, J Street, a so-called “pro-Israel” organization, is signaling that a weakened and vulnerable Israel is the only Israel they will support. Meanwhile, Israel’s enemies are sharpening their swords.
• Further, what has become blindingly evident is that anti-Israel sentiment is wildly unpopular. The marginal voices of AOC and those of the Squad’s cheerleaders like J Street, IfNotNow and Jewish Voices for Peace might yell loudly into the microphone, but they do not represent the feelings of most Americans.
• J Street is lobbying to withhold weapons from Israel “to send a message.” That message is loud and clear: J Street and Bernie Sanders are no friend of Israel, no friend of the pro-Israel community, and must be roundly rejected by all of us working to help keep Israel safe. They are playing a dangerous game with real lives on the line for sport and headlines.
• Link: J Street and Bernie Sanders are Playing a Dangerous Game with Jewish Lives

Sources: JINSA, FDD, IDF, AIPAC, The Paul Singer Foundation, The Institute for National Security Studies, the Alma Research and Education Center, Yediot, Jerusalem Post, IDF Casualty Count, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Institute for the Study of War, and the Times of Israel