Situational Update

The Times of Israel reports tonight that Israeli strikes have targeted military sites in Syria’s coastal Tartus region, with a Syria war monitor calling them “the heaviest strikes” in the area in more than a decade.

The Numbers

Casualties

• 1,811 Israelis have been killed including 816 IDF soldiers since October 7th (+1 since Wednesday)

  

  • A 12-year-old boy, Yehoshua Aharon Tuvia Simha, and several people were wounded in a terror attack targeting a Jerusalem-bound bus in the West Bank late Wednesday night.
• The South: 384 IDF soldiers during the ground operation in Gaza have been killed (no change from Wednesday)
• The North: 131 Israelis (84 IDF soldiers) have been killed during the war in Northern Israel (no change from Wednesday)
• Additional Information (according to the IDF):
  • 2,491 (no change from Wednesday) IDF soldiers have been injured during ground combat in Gaza, including at least 471 (no change from Wednesday) who have been severely injured.
  • 5,488 (+11 since Wednesday) IDF soldiers have been injured since the beginning of the war, including at least 802 (no change from Wednesday) who have been severely injured.

• According to unverified figures from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Health Ministry, 44,835 (+30 since Wednesday) people have been killed in Gaza, and 106,356 (+99 since Wednesday) have been injured during the war.
  • On October 7th, Ohad Hemo with Channel 12 Israel News – the country’s largest news network, a leading expert on Palestinian and Arab affairs, mentioned an estimate from Hamas: around 80% of those killed in Gaza are members of the organization and their families.”
    • The article goes on to say: “In an N12 article that came out this morning, Hemo also pointed out that since the elimination of key leader Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s top echelon has gone underground and fled Iran and Lebanon, with some relocating to Turkey and Qatar – with the hope that Israel will not strike them there.
  • Read this well documented piece from Tablet published in March: How the Gaza Ministry of Health Fakes Casualty Numbers
  • The Associated Press, an outlet with a demonstrated anti-Israel bias, conducted an analysis of alleged Gaza death tolls released by the Hamas-controlled “Gaza Health Ministry.” The analysis found that “9,940 of the dead – 29% of its April 30 total – were not listed in the data” and that “an additional 1,699 records in the ministry’s April data were incomplete and 22 were duplicates.”
• The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes official details on every civilian and IDF casualty.

Hostages

• There are currently 96 hostages taken on 10/7 currently in captivity in Gaza
• 7 hostages are Americans: Meet the Seven American Hostages Still Held By Hamas
• On October 7^th, a total of 261 Israelis were taken hostage.
• During the ceasefire deal in November, 112 hostages were released.
• 145 hostages in total have been released or rescued
  • The bodies of 38 hostages have been recovered, including 3 mistakenly killed by the military as they tried to escape their captors.
• 8 hostages have been rescued by troops alive
• This leaves 100 hostages still theoretically in Gaza
  • At least 34 confirmed bodies are currently being held in Gaza
  • 30-50 hostages are assumed to be dead and held in captivity
  • Thus, at most, 50-70 living hostages could still be in Gaza.
  • Hamas is also holding 2 Israeli civilians who entered the Strip in 2014 and 2015, as well as the bodies of 2 IDF soldiers who were killed in 2014.

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Watch

[WARNING: GRAPHIC TESTIMNONY] Inside Assad’s ‘Human Slaughterhouse’

• Exclusive footage and survivor testimony from inside the notorious Sednaya prison offer a glimpse into the Syrian dictator’s reign of terror.
• In collaboration with The Center for Peace Communications, we gained unprecedented access to Sednaya, capturing exclusive footage from inside its underground dungeons and recording the unvarnished testimonies of survivors—those lucky enough to emerge alive from what many have called a human slaughterhouse.
• According to one human rights group, since the anti-government protests began in 2011, over 96,000 people have disappeared into Syria’s vast network of secret prisons. Another 40,000 have been documented as prisoners. These numbers include thousands of women and children—some as young as toddlers. Most of them didn’t make it out alive. The overwhelming majority were tortured to death.

What We Are Reading

[MUST READ] Report: Questionable Counting: Analysing the Death Toll from the Hamas-Run Ministry of Health in Gaza by Andrew Fox with The Henry Jackson Society

• After Israel launched its military response, media outlets around the world began to report on death tolls in Gaza, frequently citing numbers from the ‘Gaza Ministry of Health’ as though it was a fully independent, unbiased source. In reality, the Ministry of Health (MoH) is under the full control of Hamas.
• Key Findings:
  • Men listed as women to inflate female fatalities. Analysis of Gaza Ministry of Health (MoH) fatality data reveals repeated instances of men being misclassified as women.
  • Adults registered as children. Significant discrepancies have been uncovered where adult fatalities are reclassified as children.
  • Disproportionate deaths of fighting-age men. Data analysis indicates that most fatalities are men aged 15–45, contradicting claims that civilian populations are being disproportionately targeted.
  • Inclusion of natural deaths in reporting. Despite the typical annual rate of 5,000 natural deaths in Gaza, the fatality data provides no accounting for such figures. This omission raises concerns that natural deaths, as well as deaths caused by internal violence or misfired rockets, are being included in war-related fatality counts. Instances of cancer patients, previously registered for treatment, appearing on war fatality lists further support this assertion. Such practices inflate the reported civilian death toll, complicating accurate assessments of the conflict’s impact
  • Media underreporting of combatant deaths. Analysis of media coverage reveals that only 3% of news stories reference combatant deaths, with outlets like the BBC, CNN, Reuters and The New York Times primarily relying on Gaza Ministry of Health figures.
    • 16% of articles mentioned that the Health Ministry’s figures fail to distinguish between combatants and civilians.
    • 19% of articles treated figures provided by Hamas-controlled organisations as established fact without attributing the figures to anyone.
    • Less than 2% of the media sources that used the Ministry of Health’s statistics acknowledged that they are unverifiable or contested.
• Concluding Points:
  • Our investigation into the Hamas-run Gaza Ministry of Health’s fatality reports during the conflict reveals widespread inaccuracies and distortion in the data collection process
  • These distortions primarily result from flawed methodologies, including reliance on media reports and incomplete family submissions and the inclusion of non-conflict-related deaths such as natural causes and accidental fatalities.
  • This distortion of data not only creates a misleading picture of the conflict but also raises significant concerns about the credibility of the numbers being reported across the world.
  • This has led to a narrative where the IDF is portrayed as disproportionately targeting civilians, while the actual numbers suggest a significant proportion of the dead are combatants.
  • International Humanitarian Law requires that warring parties take measures to minimise civilian harm, but the distortion of fatality data undermines efforts to assess compliance with these laws. The absence of credible data also hampers international responses, humanitarian aid efforts and peace negotiations. Without accurate and reliable figures, it becomes nearly impossible to understand the full scope of the conflict’s impact or to hold parties accountable for their actions.
  • While it is crucial to acknowledge the suffering and loss of life in Gaza, the uncritical repetition of unverified fatality figures serves to obscure the truth rather than illuminate it.
• Link to Full Report: HJS ‘Questionable Counting – Hamas’ Report

The Syria Opportunity by Bret Stephens with The New York Times

• Syria: The large question hanging over our Syria policy is whether the rebel group chiefly responsible for toppling the Assad regime, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or Organization for the Liberation of the Levant, is sincere in its renunciation of terrorism and Taliban-style Islamism. The Biden administration can offer an immediate gesture of good will by lifting the State Department’s $10 million reward for Mohammad al-Jolani, the H.T.S. leader.
• But U.S. sanctions on Syria, and H.T.S.’s status as a designated terrorist organization, should be lifted only on conditional bases. Will Syria’s new rulers allow freedom of worship for religious minorities and freedom of dress for women? Will they accept the de facto autonomy of Syria’s Kurds? Will they cooperate with international efforts to destroy ISIS? If H.T.S. really wants to cement a different relationship with Washington, it can also demand Russia’s military withdrawal from Syria, much as Egypt’s Anwar Sadat did in the 1970s.
• Lebanon. “If we lose Syria, then we will no longer have Hezbollah.” That prediction about the terrorist militia came from Soheil Karimi, a hard-line Iranian commentator. Already decimated by Israel, Hezbollah will struggle to survive as Lebanon’s dominant political entity if it doesn’t have an easy way to rearm itself. It’s in the interests of Israel, the United States and the Lebanese people that Hezbollah’s 40-plus-year reign of ruin end.
• How? The legal basis is full application of the U.N. Security Council’s Resolution 1701, which insists “there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state.” Hezbollah has brazenly flouted the demand for 18 years. Donald Trump can help enforce it by declaring in one of his social media posts that he will not consider Israel bound to honor its cease-fire deal with Hezbollah until the group fully disarms.
• Iran: The dare is also straightforward: Trump should propose what I’ve called “normalization for normalization” as a basis for improved ties with Iran. That is, America offers Iran full normalization of relations, including the lifting of economic sanctions and the reopening of embassies, in exchange for the normalization of Iranian foreign policy: a complete cessation of support for regional terror proxies like the Houthis and Hamas, and an irreversible and verifiable end to Iran’s nuclear program. Khamenei may reject the deal out of hand, since hostility to America lies at the core of the Islamic republic’s ideology, but it will give Iran’s people a standard to aspire to as they take heart from last week’s revolution in Damascus.
• Gaza. In early September I wrote a column opposing a hostage deal between Israel and Hamas. Part of my reasoning is that Israel could not afford to emerge from the war being perceived, at least by its enemies, as a loser. Since the killings of Hamas’s Yahya Sinwar and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, the devastating pager attacks, the destruction of most of Hezbollah’s arsenal and the toppling of al-Assad, things have changed. That doesn’t mean that Israel should cut a weak deal. Above all, it would be a mistake for Israel to agree to bring back the hostages in stages, since it would give Hamas an incentive to raise the price for every additional hostage.
• Other players? The Turks will have to be deterred by Washington from trying to use Syria’s revolution as an opportunity to settle scores against the Kurds. That means, especially, maintaining our detachment of forces in eastern Syria. The Saudis will also need to demonstrate regional leadership by helping rebuild Syria and resuming negotiations for diplomatic normalization with Israel.
• Link: The Syria Opportunity

The Destruction of the Syrian Army’s Weapons and the Israeli Presence in the Buffer Zone by Sarit Zehavi & Tal Beeri with Alma Israel Research & Education Center

• With its hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers deployed throughout the country, the large Syrian army barely resisted or engaged in combat. Its forces withdrew as the rebels advanced, stripping off their uniforms. Many returned to their homes, while others tried to flee to neighboring countries, with an emphasis on Iraq and Lebanon.
• Although the Syrian army collapsed, all its sites, bases, equipment, and weapons remain untouched and abandoned. In fact, as of December 08, anyone could “take home” anything from basic military equipment to advanced conventional weapons, strategic capabilities, and even unconventional weapons, such as chemical weapons.
• This is the scenario that Israel feared, and it has in fact become a clear and immediate danger.
• There is a realistic and dangerous possibility that a war of all- against -everyone could break out in Syria, forming a NO MAN’S LAND, with the motivation to seize the aforementioned weapons and use them against Israel. History indicates that these weapons could potentially target Israel. The Syrian situation is unstable, and it’s hard to predict what will happen. Therefore, it is critical to thwart in advance any potential that could develop immediately and turn into a surprise attack against Israel by rebel groups, some of which hold an extremist Islamist ideology.
• In the Middle East, “there is no such thing as there is no such thing”, immediate interests take precedence over all other considerations. It is also possible that Hezbollah, backed by Iran, could maintain certain ties with various rebel groups, allowing them to transfer some of the remaining weapons to it in exchange for large sums of money. Remember that the collapse of the Syrian regime also led to the collapse of the Iranian arms corridor to Hezbollah. This has cut off Hezbollah’s lifeline for military reconstruction and buildup.
• In order to thwart the clear and immediate danger described above, which is reflected in the large number of weapons left behind by the Syrian army, Israel [has just] launched one of the largest attack operations in the history of the IDF, with the participation of the Air Force and the Navy, with the aim of destroying these weapons. As of December 8, the IDF has carried out large-scale attacks throughout Syria in order to damage and destroy all the types of weapons and equipment described above that could pose some kind of threat to Israel in the near and distant future. The operation has carried out more than 300 attacks so far.
• In addition, Israel is operating within the buffer zone located in Syrian territory near Israel’s border. Israel learned this lesson on October 7, 2023. Israel understands that its ability to predict the intentions of a radical Islamic enemy is extremely limited, if not impossible. The concept of deterrence does not exist in the lexicon of extremist ideology, and intelligence alerts do not always exist. Given this, Israel’s margin for error is minimal in this situation. Therefore, a mistake in assessing intentions could result in the loss of many Israeli citizens’ lives. Israel cannot allow another such possibility.

Examining U.S.-Turkish Relations post October 7th, by Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (MDC). Joseph Epstein examines the US-Turkey relationship after October 7th. Erdogan’s decision to diplomatically support Hamas has complicated the relationship, adding new challenges amidst a rapidly changing balance of power in the Middle East.

• While this isn’t the first time Erdoğan has broken with Israel, the current escalation has become much worse than the usual seesawing in Israeli-Turkish relations. Erdoğan has tried to position Turkey at the spearhead in the international political fight against the Jewish State.
• For around a decade, U.S.-Turkish ties have been slowly deteriorating. Once a critical regional partner for Washington, diverging interests have turned Ankara into a competitor over such issues such as: Turkish objections to U.S. support for Syrian Kurds and Israel, as well as U.S. criticism of Turkey’s human rights record, democratic decline, and burgeoning relations with Russia.
• Since October 7th, the administration of President Joe Biden has had multiple disagreements with Turkey – mostly over Turkish-Russian relations. Washington and Ankara have continued to bicker over the latter’s 2019 acquisition of the Russian S-400 Triumf air defense system. In January, Turkey relented to Western pressure—and possibly the incentive of being allowed to buy F-16 fighter jets—and approved Sweden’s bid for NATO membership. In October, Washington forced Turkey to cease being Moscow’s “lifeline from Western sanctions” by ending the export of U.S. military-linked goods to Russia.
• Biden has hardly acknowledged Turkish hostility towards Israel and US support for Israel, but he has taken some small actions. Since October 7, the U.S. Department of Treasury has sanctioned several Turkey-based Hamas financiers and organizations supporting Hamas. Additionally, Biden has warned Turkey not to host members of the political leadership of Hamas that have been kicked out of Qatar.
• The overall lack of action or condemnation of Turkey’s anti-Israel stance may be ascribed to the Biden administration’s frustrations with Jerusalem. Since the start of the war, Biden has repeatedly tried to prevent regional war by restraining Israel’s military response with varying degrees of success. In conversations with advisors, Biden allegedly called Netanyahu a “liar” and a “bad man.” Netanyahu has not only crossed Washington “red lines,” but has even publicly exposed rifts with the administration.
• Erdoğan seems to be pleased with the election of Trump, immediately inviting him to Turkey in hopes of resetting relations with Washington.
• Despite Trump’s ardent support for Israel, Erdoğan has expressed hope that Trump would pressure Israel into ending the war as promised during his campaign. But considering Trump’s pro-Israel past and many pro-Israel appointments, it is unlikely he would do so at the expense of Israeli interests.
• In response to Turkey’s 2016 arrest of pastor Andrew Brunson, a U.S. citizen, Trump applied trade tariffs and sanctions, leading to a 40 percent drop in the value of the Turkish Lira and an economic crisis. During negotiations over Brunson’s release, Trump vowed that he would not grant Turkey any concessions. In October 2018, Erdoğan released Brunson in the hopes of improving relations. The same month, Trump reportedly told Erdoğan that he would work on extraditing the then-US-based Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen, who Ankara accused of plotting the 2016 failed coup attempt. The next month, Trump said he was not considering the extradition. Gülen died earlier this year at age 83 in self-exile in the United States.
• Trump’s pick for Secretary of State Marco Rubio has criticized Turkey’s human rights record and treatment of Kurds. He was a key architect of the East Mediterranean Security and Partnership Act, a bill approved in 2019 strengthening U.S. relations with Greece and Cyprus. Trump’s national security advisor pick Mike Waltz has been a vocal supporter of the Kurds. Even Trump’s pick for Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has been extremely critical of Turkey, accusing Ankara of “denying genocide” and working against U.S. allies in the region such as the Kurds, Israel and Greece.
• Additionally, Trump will have more leverage over Turkey than he had during his first term. The Turkish economy is a shadow of itself and the lira has been dealing with hyperinflation since 2018 (the current rate to date is 48.58 percent). In fact, the lira has depreciated so much that ATMs are breaking under the weight of increasingly worthless banknotes. Regional isolation leading to economic collapse is what spurred Erdoğan’s charm offensive in 2021 and 2022, when he tried to repair relations with Israel and the Gulf States.
• Link: Examining U.S.-Turkish Relations post October 7th

How to Bring Back Maximum Pressure on Iran by Richard Goldberg in Jewish Policy Center

• At the end of 2020, the Islamic Republic of Iran was down to just $4 billion in accessible foreign exchange reserves. Its terrorist mastermind, Qassem Solemani, and the godfather of its nuclear weapons program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, were dead. The regime in Tehran was afraid that its nuclear and missile infrastructure might be targeted at any moment. The ayatollah had halted his climb up the escalation ladder of uranium enrichment for months.
• Budgets for terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas were down. The Houthis would soon be added to America’s official terrorist list while the US provided intelligence, logistics and defensive support to Gulf Arab partners working to degrade Iran’s terror proxy in Yemen.
• To restore what we had before, Trump will need to direct his administration to make that campaign a priority, particularly on the enforcement of U.S. sanctions to drain the regime of resources that fund its wide-ranging malign activities. And that should start with a national security presidential memorandum issued on January 20 making clear to every department and agency of the US government that maximum pressure is back.
• Congress passed a series of Iran sanctions laws last decade that provided the president with authority to temporarily suspend or “waive” the application of sanctions if the president determines such a move is needed for national security. The Biden administration issued a waiver to allow South Korea to transfer $6 billion to banks in Qatar for Iran’s use – ostensibly the ransom payment for the release of five American dual citizens held hostage by Tehran but in truth a down payment on an unacknowledged nuclear deal that paid the regime not to further enrich uranium to weapons-grade purity.
• Another waiver, which was renewed shortly after the November election, gave Iran access to at least $10 billion in accounts in Iraq and Oman – money Baghdad owed Tehran for electricity imports but that the first Trump administration had rendered inaccessible.
• Any waiver in effect that gives Iran access to cash should be canceled immediately. In the case of Iraq, the new administration should revert to its former policy: Allow Iraq to temporarily import electricity provided that any money owed be kept in an escrow account in Baghdad – but move heaven and earth to unhook Iraq from Iranian electricity dependency. Funds in Oman and Qatar should be locked down as well. And any other bank around the world still holding Iranian funds – from New Delhi to Tokyo to Beijing – should be reminded that U.S. sanctions are back in full force.
• Next comes sanctions enforcement. Under the Biden administration, Iran’s oil exports skyrocketed from 300,000-500,000 barrels per day to anywhere between 1.5 million and 2 million barrels per day. Most of it goes to China. Biden made a proactive decision not to confront Beijing over this illicit trade. “Experts” tell the media that there’s little the United States can do about this trade because the Chinese Communist Party has smartly delegated the activity to so-called “teapot refineries” that are disconnected from any known Chinese state-owned enterprise.
• The US is more than capable of tracking every oil tanker that leaves an Iranian port and heads to China – and a new law, the SHIP Act, gives the president authority to impose sanctions on every Chinese port that allows that cargo to land. A new administration should make clear that vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers – a common method to evade sanctions by offloading illicit cargo on to another ship midway through the journey – will be covered by the law.
• To avoid negative impacts on the oil market, these moves should be tightly coordinated with Trump’s new National Energy Council, which has been tasked with making America energy dominant. A green light to American energy and an end to the global war on fossil fuels will more than mitigate any market pressure from tighter oil sanctions enforcement.
• While energy exports are Iran’s lifeblood, they aren’t the only priorities for US sanctions enforcement. As my FDD colleague Dr. Saeed Ghasseminejad has written, a new Trump administration can further drain Tehran’s coffers by expanding US sanctions on Iran’s metals industry to cover zinc, nickel, and lithium, and targeting Iran’s automotive sector – most particularly the Chinese car companies that are operating joint ventures in violation of US sanctions.
• The White House should keep in mind that the Commerce Department should play a meaningful role in maximum pressure: Using export controls to go after suppliers of western technology to Iran and using the department’s Entity List when meeting the evidentiary threshold for sanctions presents a challenge. Another creative policy to pursue might be the pseudo-privatization of sanctions enforcement – finding ways to incentivize whistleblowers and bounty-hunters, rather than just relying on the intelligence community.
• And, without a doubt, a credible threat of military action must be on the table – clearly communicated to Tehran from day one, and quickly demonstrated to the regime in and around Yemen should the Houthis continue attacks on the Red Sea. The regime is closer than ever to nuclear weapons capabilities. A covert breakout attempt is a real possibility. The regime may consider retaliating either directly or via proxies over US sanctions pressure. Trump will only have a free hand to squeeze Tehran economically if the ayatollah fears him militarily – and also perceive that he has given Israel his blessing to take whatever steps it deems necessary to remove Tehran’s most existential threats.
• Link: How to Bring Back Maximum Pressure on Iran

The Middle East’s Dangerous New Normal by Suzanne Maloney with Foreign Affairs

• The death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a May 2024 helicopter accident briefly distracted the theocracy and appeared to disrupt the escalatory spiral. But it was not long before the conflict flared again. In August, Israel assassinated the Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh at an official Iranian guesthouse in Tehran, only hours after Haniyeh had met with Khamenei and attended the inauguration of the country’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian. Less than two months later, Israel escalated in Lebanon, laying waste to decades of Iranian investment in Hezbollah in an abrupt and humiliating fashion. Via remote control, Israel detonated tiny explosives it had secretly implanted in thousands of pagers used by Hezbollah operatives, disrupting the group’s command and control. Israeli forces then killed nearly the entire upper echelon of Hezbollah’s leadership, including its longtime chief, Hassan Nasrallah, and destroyed much of the group’s weaponry.
• Consider the record. In January 2020, the Trump administration assassinated Qasem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Quds Force—the branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in charge of managing relations with Iran’s allies and proxies. At first, the killing seemed like a symbolic and operational disaster for Tehran, given just how key Soleimani was to its foreign policy. Yet his death ultimately had little enduring effect on the strength, durability, or efficacy of Iran’s axis of resistance. Similarly, in 1992, when Israel killed Abbas al-Musawi, Hezbollah’s leader at the time, it paved the way for the ascension of Nasrallah, who proved to be a far more effective and deadly adversary. A month later, Hezbollah retaliated by orchestrating the deadly bombing of Israel’s embassy in Argentina.
• The evisceration of Tehran’s most valuable assets, Hezbollah and the Assad regime, is a catastrophic blow for the Islamic Republic. But a weakened Iran is not necessarily a less dangerous Iran. Iran is “staring you in the eye” and “will fight you to the end,” Hossein Salami, the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, declared to Israel in November. “We will not allow you to dominate the fate of Muslims. You will receive painful blows—keep awaiting revenge.” This may be garden-variety Iranian bluster, but it would be a mistake and out of step with historical precedent to presume that even a massive strategic reversal will induce Iranian quiescence.
• Meanwhile, the incoming national security adviser, Mike Waltz, has lambasted President Joe Biden for imposing restrictions on Israel as it prosecutes its war in Gaza. Unlike the Biden administration, then, the Trump team may have little regard for the potential blowback from a sustained attempt to erode the capabilities of the Houthis in Yemen and Iraq’s Shiite militias. If so, the region could be headed for more bloodshed. Should Israel or the United States take off their gloves in Iraq and Yemen, they could destabilize Iraq and prompt the Houthis to target U.S. partners in the Middle East: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). That could complicate the planned phase-down of U.S. troops in Iraq and leave a precarious power vacuum in the heart of the Arab world that Tehran and other extremists would seek to exploit. So could uncertainty regarding the future of Lebanon and Syria. Yet Trump’s policy may prove more nuanced than unwavering confrontation. For starters, the new administration will find that the tools at its disposal are less effective than when Trump deployed them during his first term. His maximum pressure sanctions, for example, succeeded in slashing Iran’s oil exports and revenues thanks to cooperation from China, which Beijing may not be willing to repeat. The smuggling networks that enable Iranian oil to reach China have become more elaborate and more difficult to counter through sanctions designations alone. Any significant new economic coercion could also face headwinds from Washington’s crucial Gulf allies, whose leaders now prefer to co-opt rather than confront Tehran.
• Then there are Trump’s own views on Iran. The president-elect has suggested there is a method to his madness—and that he desires a deal. During his 2024 campaign, Trump disavowed regime change and declared that he wanted Iran “to be a very successful country.” He has recently suggested that had he won in 2020, he would have concluded an agreement with Tehran “within one week after the election.” And Trump appears to have greenlighted early engagement with Iranian officials this time around, having sent one of his closest confidants, the billionaire Elon Musk, to meet with the country’s UN ambassador in November.
• To succeed, Trump will have to manage the competing views and priorities of his own administration’s staffers. But an unsentimental assessment of the regional landscape offers some sense of how Trump could proceed. He might start, as he did in his first term, in the Gulf. The Gulf states desperately want an end to the war in Gaza, which would serve their own economic and security interests as well as Israel’s. The UAE has been in discussions with Washington about helping establish a postwar Palestinian government in Gaza and obtaining security and reconstruction funding. Trump could continue these conversations and use them to help end Israel’s war. The Gulf states could also help Trump forge a new deal with Iran. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have strong channels of communication with Tehran, which Trump could tap into. The Arab world would certainly welcome an agreement that prevents a full-scale war, which would have catastrophic consequences.
• This confluence of interests is useful but hardly sufficient to achieve the outcomes Trump desires. That is where the president-elect’s volatility and ruthlessness could be an unexpected asset. If Trump reinstates meaningful economic pressure on Iran and gives Israel some additional leeway for military action, he might better demonstrate U.S. capabilities and thus force Iran to reverse its current, uncompromising policy positions. A muscular U.S. approach has paid dividends in the past with an Iranian leadership whose foremost interest is in regime survival. Such an approach would likely be an improvement over that of the Biden administration, which relied almost exclusively on conciliation that Iran saw as weak and desperate. The result of the shift could be a real deal of the century: an abatement of the multipronged conflicts raging in the Middle East, a political horizon and reconstruction for the Palestinians and the Lebanese, and some nominal concessions from Tehran on its nuclear program and regional malfeasance.
• Link: The Middle East’s Dangerous New Normal

Antisemitism

• The Foundation to Combat Antisemitism (FCAS) publishes weekly information from over 300 million online data sources including public social media, traditional media, websites, blogs, forums, and more. The bigger the phrase on the above image, the more total mentions it had in the time period.

Wikipedia suspends pro-Palestine editors coordinating efforts behind the scenes by Ohad Merlin with The Jerusalem Post

• An arbitration committee set up by Wikipedia for “Palestine-Israel Cases” has banned two editors indefinitely and imposed restrictions on three others.
• The committee highlighted the off-wiki misconduct in the Palestine–Israel topic area, accusing editors of making edits in the Palestine–Israel topic area after off-wiki canvassing requests and “encouraging other users to game the extended confirmed restriction and engage in disruptive editing.”
• “Wikibias,” an X account that examines these attempts and exposes anti-Israel bias on the Free Encyclopedia, lauded the decision taken by the committee, adding that other “toxic editors” are still manipulating information in articles such as “Use of Human Shields by Hamas.” The outlet continued: “it is high time the Arbitration Committee takes immediate action to thoroughly investigate and hold all editors… accountable for their distortion of Wikipedia content.”
• Wikipedia, a self-described endeavor where anyone can contribute to the world’s common knowledge, is owned by the Wikimedia Foundation, an NGO which, as a matter of principle, rarely interferes in the content and editing process of specific entries, even when facing stories of widespread bias and misinformation.
• According to the blog, these groups of editors collaborated to set up “war rooms” with weekly meetings to coordinate editing efforts, with some in the group self-describing as an “instrument of the Gaza war for the elimination of Israel.”
• Last month, The Jerusalem Post published an investigative report on the bigotry, misinformation, and bias found on Wikipedia’s Arabic version, which included a plethora of examples from offensive generalizations against Jews to denial and downplaying of the October 7th Massacre. It also revolved around Arabic Wikipedia’s distinctive editing pool which limits automatically accepted edits to a closed group of editors, differing from the English version which mostly allows editing freely.
• Link: Wikipedia suspends pro-Palestine editors coordinating efforts behind the scenes

Sources: JINSA, FDD, IDF, AIPAC, The Paul Singer Foundation, The Institute for National Security Studies, the Alma Research and Education Center, Yediot, Jerusalem Post, IDF Casualty Count, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Institute for the Study of War, and the Times of Israel