Situational Update

• Per the Institute for the Study of War: The Houthis fired a Palestine-2 ballistic missile targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area, injuring 16 Israelis. The IDF fired interceptors but missed the projectile. The missile landed near a playground in the Tel Aviv area (thankfully it was in the evening and no children were present). The IDF separately intercepted a likely Houthi drone that entered southern Israeli airspace. In response, per the Times of Israel, the United States (CENTCOM) on Saturday said it struck targets in Yemen’s rebel-held capital, including a Houthi missile storage center and a “command-and-control facility.” American forces also shot down multiple Houthi drones and an anti-ship cruise missile over the Red Sea.
  • Following the strikes on Houthi targets, the US military said that two US Navy pilots were shot down over the Red Sea in an apparent “friendly fire” incident, marking the most serious incident to threaten troops in over a year of America targeting the Houthi rebels. Both pilots were recovered alive, with one suffering minor injuries in the incident.

The Numbers

Casualties

• 1,813 Israelis have been killed including 818 IDF soldiers since October 7th (no change since Wednesday)
• The South: 386 IDF soldiers during the ground operation in Gaza have been killed (no change since Wednesday)
• The North: 131 Israelis (84 IDF soldiers) have been killed during the war in Northern Israel (no change since Wednesday)
• Additional Information (according to the IDF):
  • 2,491 (no change since Wednesday) IDF soldiers have been injured during ground combat in Gaza, including at least 471 (no change since Wednesday) who have been severely injured.
  • 5,508 (+15 since Wednesday) IDF soldiers have been injured since the beginning of the war, including at least 803 (+1 since Wednesday) who have been severely injured.

• According to unverified figures from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Health Ministry, 45,097 (+38 since Wednesday) people have been killed in Gaza, and 107,244 (+203 since Wednesday) have been injured during the war.
  • Report: Questionable Counting: Analysing the Death Toll from the Hamas-Run Ministry of Health in Gaza by Andrew Fox with The Henry Jackson Society
  • On October 7th, Ohad Hemo with Channel 12 Israel News – the country’s largest news network, a leading expert on Palestinian and Arab affairs, mentioned an estimate from Hamas: around 80% of those killed in Gaza are members of the organization and their families.”
    • The article goes on to say: “In an N12 article that came out this morning, Hemo also pointed out that since the elimination of key leader Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s top echelon has gone underground and fled Iran and Lebanon, with some relocating to Turkey and Qatar – with the hope that Israel will not strike them there.
  • Read this well documented piece from Tablet published in March: How the Gaza Ministry of Health Fakes Casualty Numbers
  • The Associated Press, an outlet with a demonstrated anti-Israel bias, conducted an analysis of alleged Gaza death tolls released by the Hamas-controlled “Gaza Health Ministry.” The analysis found that “9,940 of the dead – 29% of its April 30 total – were not listed in the data” and that “an additional 1,699 records in the ministry’s April data were incomplete and 22 were duplicates.”
• The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes official details on every civilian and IDF casualty.

Hostages

• There are currently 96 hostages taken on 10/7 currently in captivity in Gaza
• 7 hostages are Americans: Meet the Seven American Hostages Still Held By Hamas
• On October 7^th, a total of 261 Israelis were taken hostage.
• During the ceasefire deal in November, 112 hostages were released.
• 145 hostages in total have been released or rescued
  • The bodies of 38 hostages have been recovered, including 3 mistakenly killed by the military as they tried to escape their captors.
• 8 hostages have been rescued by troops alive
• This leaves 100 hostages still theoretically in Gaza
  • At least 34 confirmed bodies are currently being held in Gaza
  • 30-50 hostages are assumed to be dead and held in captivity
  • Thus, at most, 50-70 living hostages could still be in Gaza.
  • Hamas is also holding 2 Israeli civilians who entered the Strip in 2014 and 2015, as well as the bodies of 2 IDF soldiers who were killed in 2014.

Listen

[PODCAST] Call Me Back with Dan Senor: 1929: A harbinger of October 7th – with Yardena Schwartz

• August 23rd, 1929, nearly 100 years ago, marks the day of what is referred to in history as the 1929 Arab Riots: a wave of pogroms waged against the Jews living in British Mandatory Palestine. These pogroms began in Jerusalem and quickly spread to other cities and towns, including Hebron, Safed, Jaffa, and Haifa. The riots had largely subsided by August 29th, after 113 Jews were murdered.
• Our guest is Yardena Schwartz, author of the recently published book: “Ghosts of a Holy War: The 1929 Massacre in Palestine That Ignited the Arab-Israeli Conflict” – a meticulously researched work that examines the 1929 Hebron massacre, where nearly 70 Jewish residents were killed by their Arab neighbors and friends, and that explores its impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Watch

[WARNING: GRAPHIC TESTIMONY] In an interview with Israel’s Channel 12, Nova Festival survivor Yuval Sharvit Trabelsi:

“I saw my husband dead. I smeared his blood on me and on my friends so if the terrorists look at us they’ll think we are dead. We saw point blank killings and kidnapping but the hardest thing we witnessed was the rape. I never heard cries for help like from that woman”.

• Watch the video with English subtitles

Israel

RIP, the Axis of Resistance: Iran’s revolutionary project for the Middle East sowed misery and won’t be missed. By Arash Azizi in The Atlantic

• Syria was both the organizing ground and the proof of concept for the Axis. Assad owed his throne to its armies, which helped him kill hundreds of thousands of civilians in the civil war that began in 2011. Unlike other members of the Axis, Assad wasn’t an Islamist. He also had real differences with Hamas (the only Sunni member of the Axis) and the Yemeni Houthis. But other than Iran itself, Syria was the only United Nations member-state to be considered part of the Axis, and its territory was crucial.
• With Assad gone, Iran faces a reckoning. Why did it spend tens of billions of dollars and thousands of lives on a regime that collapsed like a house of cards?
• …Khamenei’s bravado isn’t fooling anyone. Israel had already battered the Axis, and Syria’s Turkey-backed Sunni Islamists have completed the job. Khamenei is barely able to respond to Israel’s repeated attacks on Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and even Iran itself. His policy has failed.
• All that remained to unite the Axis members was the quest to destroy Israel. As a result, instead of building a better life for their constituents, the Axis members made their countries into Iranian beachheads in a shadow conflict with the United States and Israel.
• …the most important capital to be affected by the fall of the Axis is Tehran. Khamenei’s regional policy was supposed to keep the U.S. and Israel at bay. It appears to have done the opposite.
• Tehran never even answered the Israeli strikes of October 26, because it knew it had few palatable options for doing so. Its bluff called, Iran is now in a corner. And to make matters worse, next month Donald Trump will return to the White House, likely bringing his policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran back with him.
• Nobody will miss the Axis of Resistance. But the history of the Middle East has demonstrated that the demise of a bad actor is not sufficient to produce better ones. The Axis will leave a vacuum that other unsavory forces could fill.
• What the affected countries will need to avoid that outcome is a combination of foreign direct investment and the will to mediate their internal differences. The two are linked: Disputes are much easier to solve when all parties have a reasonable prospect of prosperity.
• Link: RIP to the Axis of Resistance

An Israeli Order in the Middle East: A Chance to Defeat the Iranian Vision for the Region—and Improve on the American Vision by Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov in Foreign Affairs

• Since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, three competing visions for that order have emerged and then faltered: the Hamas vision, the Hezbollah-Iranian vision, and the American vision.
• None of these visions, however, proved tractable: Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran misjudged the strength of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Israeli society, and the U.S.-Israeli alliance. The United States overestimated its capacity to influence Israel’s approach to the war in Gaza and did not sufficiently contend with the regional threat posed by Iran.
• The failure of these three visions creates an opening for a more realistic fourth one: an Israeli vision.
• Israel is now reshaping the Middle East through military operations, but it would benefit from asserting itself politically, too. It has both the opportunity and the responsibility to steer the region’s trajectory toward a new, more peaceful and sustainable reality.
• An Arab-Israeli coalition backed by the United States could repel threats from Shiite and Sunni radicals, provide the Palestinians with a realistic political future, safeguard Israel’s security interests, secure the return of the Israeli hostages still in Gaza, and prevent another attack on Israeli soil.
• Israel must not seek to impose its vision of a new regional order alone. It needs buy-in from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Germany and the United Kingdom
• Israel must build on its operational triumphs by clarifying and pursuing a coherent strategic vision of a moderate regional alliance between Israel and the Sunni Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia. It must address key security threats, foremost among them Iran, and present a unified front against Turkey’s and Qatar’s attempts to bolster the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in the Arab world, a task made all the more urgent following the collapse of the Assad regime. Finally, the coalition must offer the Palestinians a political future while safeguarding Israel against future terrorist attacks.
• The first step: Israel should convene a summit with the United States, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and any actors aspiring to help reshape the Middle East, including Palestinian representatives, in a leading Middle Eastern capital such as Riyadh. Its objectives would include establishing a U.S.-Arab-Israeli alliance based on a shared regional vision; advancing the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia (and, ideally, additional countries such as Oman and Indonesia); creating a new regional security framework; and establishing a road map for a Gaza free of Hamas through a deradicalization campaign. The plan should also aim to increase the Gulf states’ footprint in Syria to reduce the influence of Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood in the country.
• Furthermore, Arab leaders must agree that Gaza’s reconstruction by the alliance will proceed only after the territory is fully demilitarized, at which point Israel must commit to withdrawing the IDF. Before then, the IDF must retain the ability to establish a security buffer zone within Gaza along the border with Israel to prevent any potential Hamas military buildups.
• The summit should aim to accelerate the development of a permanent regional defense architecture. Dedicated task forces led by U.S. Central Command, the IDF, and the militaries of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates would address air and missile defense, secure maritime navigation, counter terrorism from Shiite and Sunni extremists, and enhance intelligence sharing.
• Link: An Israeli Order in the Middle East

The day intelligence collapsed: What happened to Shin Bet on Oct. 7? by Itay Ilnai in Israel Hayom (an Israeli media outlet)

• At around 5:00 a.m. on Saturday, Oct. 7, the operational phone of Chief Insp. Arnon Zmora, rang. On the other end was a senior officer from the elite Yamam counterterrorism unit. “Shin Bet has detected something in Gaza,” he said. “Get ready.”
• Zmora, who was at the unit’s base not far from Jerusalem, where he was commanding an alert team, had not received any further instructions. In fact, he wasn’t even told to hurry. The only information he received was to head to the Gaza periphery and take up an alert position.
• It turns out that even after the surprise attack began, Shin Bet had no clue what Hamas was planning or what was happening on the ground. The intelligence body responsible for preventing terrorism from Gaza (alongside the Military Intelligence Directorate), which has been in a fierce struggle with Hamas for nearly 40 years, suffered a crushing defeat.
• In the wake of these revelations, we can now report for the first time that the investigations point to several key issues. For example, Hamas’ “Flood of Al-Aqsa” plan, which was well known within Shin Bet, did not receive proper attention. Additionally, agents working for Shin Bet in the strip communicated with their handlers during the night of Oct. 7 but either misled them or simply didn’t know about Hamas’ attack plans. Investigations also reveal that Shin Bet’s Southern District was unaware of the Nova Music Festival, which took place right along the Gaza border.
• Another interesting finding in the investigations concerns the timing of Hamas’ decision to launch the surprise attack. According to estimates, Yahya Sinwar and a small circle of associates made the fateful decision just in the days leading up to the attack. This alone made it especially difficult for Shin Bet to detect Hamas’ plans early.
• The Shin Bet also deserves credit for its rapid recovery, which began on the morning of Oct. 7, when dozens of its agents went to fight in dozens of areas, suffering painful losses: ten Shin Bet operatives were killed that day. Afterward, the Shin Bet went into war mode across all areas: Gaza, the West Bank, inside Israel, Lebanon, and foreign security.
• Even within the small circle of Sinwar, the forum that made the last-minute decision to launch the “Flood al-Aqsa” operation, it seems that only two individuals remain alive.
• Link: The day intelligence collapsed

The Strike in Yemen: A Justified Response—But Insufficient for Changing the Reality by Tamir Hayman with the Institute for National Security Studies

• Two critical elements have been entirely absent in the campaign against the Houthis.
  • One is striking the sender, Iran, which funds and orchestrates the missiles from Yemen. Both the international coalition and Israel have responded directly to the proxy rather than to the hand rocking the cradle.
  • Second, there has been no effort to destroy the Houthis’ command and control or significantly degrade their military power. In other words, there is no extensive and sustained campaign to weaken the Houthis in a way that intensifies the pressure, as has been done with Israel’s other adversaries in the current war.
• What should be done? A sustained campaign is needed, not just a single operation. Such a campaign requires different intelligence and strike capabilities. Israel needs to build operational capacities that allow for greater flexibility and precision. These capabilities, given the distance from Israel, require a different level of organization. When choosing which branch should lead the campaign—the Air Force or the Navy—the Navy has significant advantages in these areas. Additionally, beyond tactical capabilities, Israel must conduct a military campaign that targets the Houthis as a cohesive military system.
• This involves addressing operational questions to fundamentally alter the Houthis’ motivation and capabilities: Who are their commanders? How is their logistics structured? What capabilities enable their continued attacks? How can the Houthis’ area of operation in Yemen be isolated? And can direct threats be posed against their commanders in ways that leverage Israel’s proven abilities?
• Link: The Strike in Yemen: A Justified Response—But Insufficient for Changing the Reality

The Options We Face in Syria – And What’s Good for Israel by Eyal Haluta with FDD

• The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in the face of rebel groups, primarily Hayat Tahrir al-Sham headed by Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani, constitutes a genuine turning point in the Middle East.
• It is unclear whether Al-Jolani’s attempts to reunite Syria into a single entity will succeed or whether Syria will continue to be a patchwork of minority groups fighting each other. Israel, for its part, should continue backing the minorities that cooperate with it (especially the Druze and the Kurds) and keep hostile elements away from its border.
• As Damascus re-emerges, it will face three strategic alternatives.
  • The most likely alternative is to continue deepening ties with Turkey, and to be the spearhead of Erdogan’s expansionist regional policy. Al-Jolani grew up in the lap of radical Sunni Islam and his relationship with Erdogan has grown stronger over the years.
  • The second alternative is to fall into the honey trap that Iran will likely set for Damascus. It is difficult to see Iran giving up easily on its strategic asset in Syria, as the loss of Syria leaves Iran bruised and having lost its position as defender of the Shiite axis.
  • The third alternative is for Syria to return to the fold of the Arab States. The departure of Assad, who was expelled from the Arab League for massacring his own people, increases the motivation of the Gulf States to return the new Syria to the fold.
• Israel has an obvious interest in Syria being as moderate as possible. Israel has a vital interest in keeping Iran out of the picture and an equally large interest in preventing the emergence of a Sunni Islamist caliphate on its border. Israel also has an interest in helping the Kurdish and Druze minorities, with whom it has a longstanding relationship. It is not surprising that the Israeli interest overlaps with that of the pragmatic Arab states, which are also aiming to reduce Iranian and Islamic influences in their countries.
• Link: The Options We Face in Syria – And What’s Good for Israel

Antisemitism

[MUST READ] The cult of the keffiyeh: How pitying Palestine and hating Israel became the ultimate luxury belief. This is an extract from Brendan O’Neill’s book, After the Pogrom: 7 October, Israel and the Crisis of Civilisation.

• Keffiyeh chic is all the rage. You’re no one unless you have one of these black-and-white scarves that are widely worn in the Palestinian territories. Student radicals, celebrities, Guardian-reading dads on their way for a macchiato – everyone has a keffiyeh draped over their shoulders. It has become the uniform of the politically enlightened, the must-have of the socially aware.
• No, there is something else going on with the cult of the keffiyeh, something that falls outside of the traditional realm of solidarity and even awareness-raising. That an item of clothing has become so omnipresent among the virtuous set, that the activist class covets this scarf with such relish that there has been an ‘influx of mass- produced keffiyehs’ into our societies, points to a performative streak in pro-Palestine activism.
• The cult of the keffiyeh is proof that Palestine has become, in the words of Jake Wallis Simons, the great ‘social signifier’ of the radically chic of the Western world.
• This goes way beyond ‘cultural appropriation’ – it is the wholesale moral appropriation of an entire people and their plight by the political intimates of high society with virtue to advertise.
• Since Hamas’s pogrom of 7 October, ‘urban combat with a twist of Middle Eastern’ has become the look once more in socially aware circles. You declare your pronouns, you take the knee and you wear a keffiyeh. And this time, apparently, it’s not fashion, it’s politics. It’s not style, it’s solidarity. It’s no mere ‘fiery symbol’ – it’s a fiery statement of one’s deep convictions about Israel / Palestine.
• It’s the same CNN which sternly reminded the good people of the United States that cultural appropriation is ‘when people with power and privilege take customs and traditions that oppressed people have long been marginalised for and repurpose them as a hot new thing’.
• That might just be the best description of the fad for keffiyeh-wearing: people with privilege (Ivy League radicals, the laptop elites, latte socialists) taking a custom of a foreign people (the Bedouin and the Palestinians) and turning it into the ‘hot new thing’ – as the Guardian says, the keffiyeh truly has been ‘cemented… as a hot item’.
• Clearly, a calculation has been made by the cultural establishment. It has decided that in the case of the keffiyeh, more status points can be accrued through the wearing of it than through the policing of its wearing.
• What holy service does this garment play in the lives of the elites? Its prime role is as a signifier of virtue. It is sartorial shorthand for ethical correctness. It communicates to your fellow travellers in the universe of luxury beliefs that you, too, have contempt for Israel and compassion for Palestine – an entirely requisite credo for access to the cultural establishment in the 21st century.
• Wearing the keffiyeh in public, or posting photos online of yourself wrapped up in one, is fundamentally a statement of your moral fitness for political high society.

• Indeed, a post-pogrom survey of US students, those most likely to be adorned in the keffiyeh, uncovered an alarmingly frail grasp on the fundamental facts of the Middle East. For instance, only 47 per cent of the students who regularly chant the infamous slogan, ‘From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free’, were able to name the river and the sea it references.
• Think about this: radical youths wear the keffiyeh without knowing where it comes from.
• Consider where their keffiyehs are likely to come from – China. The great paradox of the cult of the keffiyeh is that, as Niloufar Haidari reports, ‘the more popular the keffiyeh has become in the West, the less this has translated into a boon for the Palestinian economy’. There is only one Palestinian weavery left that makes keffiyehs. The keffiyehs we see in the coffee shops, campuses and art galleries of the West are ‘mass-produced’ items ‘from China’. The last remaining keffiyeh-maker in the Palestinian territories says it has become ‘increasingly difficult to compete with the low prices of the imported counterfeits’.
• Nothing better captures the moral unworldliness of the pro-Palestine set than the fact that their sartorial signifiers of status were likely made by hyper-exploited workers in the world’s largest unfree state.
• That their noisy displays of moral concern for Palestine are being facilitated by poorly paid weavers in an authoritarian state for whom their moral concern is thin indeed, if not non-existent.
• The keffiyeh classes, it seems to me, crave the moral rush of oppression, the thrill of persecution. They pull on the garb of a beleaguered people in order to escape, however fleetingly, the pampered reality of their own lives. In order to taste that most prized of social assets in the woke era: victimhood.
• The cult of victimhood’s greatest offence is to reduce everything to a simplistic clash between the oppressed and the oppressor, good and evil, light and dark. This movement requires not only victims it might ostentatiously empathise with, but also the opposite: victimisers, the monsters of persecution, who must be noisily raged at.
• The end result? Protesters in keffiyehs telling Jews in New York City to ‘go back to Poland’. Activists in keffiyehs shouting on the New York subway: ‘Raise your hand if you’re a Zionist.’ Britons in keffiyehs marching alongside radical Islamists who long for further pogroms against the Jewish State. The aftermath of 7 October is a painful reminder that the facile moral binaries of identity politics are far more likely to resuscitate racism than tackle it.
• Link: The cult of the keffiyeh

How Hamas fooled the media: A neuroscientist’s view by Dr. Orli Peter in The Jewish Chronicle

• In a recent video released by the IDF, a captured Palestinian Islamic Jihad spokesman called Tarek Abu Shaluf described how he was taught to create false narratives about the Gaza war to appeal to Western humanitarian values. “The international media differs from the Arab ones. They focus on humanitarian issues. We don’t speak to them in the language of violence, destruction and revenge,” he said.
• The effects are clear. Across the Middle East, militant groups from Hamas to the Syrian rebels orchestrate calculated psychological operations. Seen from a clinical point of view, they demonstrate exceptional skills in cognitive empathy, which they use to manipulate our emotions.
• Using cognitive empathy, militants have learnt to present their cause as aligned with Western humanitarian values, carefully curating their image as champions of freedom and justice. This dynamic is rooted in asymmetrical power relationships, where weaker groups often develop a detailed understanding of powerful parties, using cognitive empathy to identify and press the psychological buttons that influence those in power. These terrorists often possess a stronger cognitive grasp of Western psychology than Westerners understand jihadi psychology.
• Many Westerners, particularly those who live free from war or violence – like many of the students protesting on college campuses – attribute benevolence to militants, sympathising with them as “victims”.
• Through graphic imagery and tales of victimhood, they provoke “pain empathy”, the visceral emotional reaction to witnessing suffering. Our brains are wired to respond more deeply to the image of a single suffering child than to statistics about millions of people, a phenomenon known as the “identifiable victim effect”.
• Hamas and its sympathisers skilfully exploit pain-empathy circuits in the brain, flooding the media with real or manipulated images of dead children, even misrepresenting gruesome scenes from other wars – including the Shoah in cases of “Holocaust inversion” – as Palestinian casualties of Israel.
• For example, militant propagandists sent the Western media images of Gazan suffering, while Hamas broadcast GoPro videos of torture and murder to their supporters to invigorate them. They highlighted their victimhood and suffering under the “occupation” of the “colonisers”. They played it brilliantly.
• Link: How Hamas fooled the media: A neuroscientist’s view

The Gaza war is the biggest failure of journalism in history: 98 per cent of reporters cite fabricated Hamas casualty figures. Only five per cent mention Israeli data. Jihadi propaganda has gone global by Jake Wallis Simons

• According to the new report – produced by Andrew Fox for the Henry Jackson Society – only five per cent of the media organisations surveyed cited casualty figures issued by the Israeli authorities. By contrast, 98 per cent used those provided by the Hamas-controlled health ministry.
• This means that almost all Western media outlets have unflinchingly disseminated Hamas propaganda to their tens of millions of viewers while disregarding Israeli figures almost entirely. The world’s journalists have taken the word of jihadi butchers above the evidence-based testimony of a friendly democracy and shared this narrative with the world.
• It is no exaggeration to say that this comprises the most scandalous betrayal of journalistic ethics in history.
• The world’s media knows full well that Hamas is the gatekeeper of film from Gaza. They know that as a result, their viewers will never see any evidence of dead or wounded terrorists on their screens, only dead or injured civilians. Any ethical broadcaster would screen such material with a health warning: “the following footage has been censored by Hamas”. But not a single one has done so.
• The results can be seen in the polls. In October 2023, Britons were almost twice as likely to hold Hamas most responsible for the war than the Israeli government. After a year of misinformation in the media, however, 60 per cent considered Israel’s military actions to have gone too far in Gaza, with only 12 per cent thinking it was “about right”.
• The truth, of course, is that Israel has killed about one civilian for every combatant in Gaza. Every single such death is a profound tragedy, but as numerous international experts in urban warfare have confirmed, this rate of collateral damage is lower than any other army has accomplished in history, including the British and American armed forces.
• Link: The Gaza war is the biggest failure of journalism in history

Two reports expose the increase in antisemitism in the healthcare community:

• Social Media, Survey, and Medical Literature Data Reveal Escalating Antisemitism Within the United States Healthcare Community in The Journal of Religion and Health
  • Data from the Foundation to Combat Antisemitism’s Command Center was included in a recently published academic paper that revealed a sharp rise in antisemitism within the U.S. healthcare sector
  • We analyzed the X accounts of over 220,000 self-identified healthcare professionals and found Antisemitism-related posts increased 5.4x since October 7, 2023
  • Mentions of “Jewish power” rose 3.4x
  • There was a 24x increase in sentiments of fear within these conversations
  • The paper also included results from a survey of 170 Jewish-identifying healthcare workers which showed that 88.4% experienced antisemitism after October 7, up from 40.3% prior.
  • The study highlights the urgent need for healthcare institutions to address this growing crisis.
  • Link to Full Report
• Jewish medical professionals face ‘alarmingly high’ exposure to antisemitism by StandWithUs and the Journal of General Internal Medicine
  • 39.2% of Jewish medical professionals, mostly physicians, reported “direct exposure” to antisemitism in their professional or academic settings
  • 26.4% felt unsafe due to the prevalence of antisemitic incidents.
  • Only 1.9% of the 645 Jewish medical professionals representing 32 states reported antisemitism being included in antibias training, and 71.6% of respondents agreed that antisemitism should be included.
  • Respondents also reported “social and professional isolation” from their peers based on their Jewish identity, “hateful speakers” present at professional conferences, and being placed on a “do not call or hire” list based on Jewish identity or connection to Israel.
  • Of the 645 respondents, 74% are physicians, and 52.1% are in academia
  • Link: Jewish medical professionals face ‘alarmingly high’ exposure to antisemitism

Sources: JINSA, FDD, IDF, AIPAC, The Paul Singer Foundation, The Institute for National Security Studies, the Alma Research and Education Center, Yediot, Jerusalem Post, IDF Casualty Count, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Institute for the Study of War, and the Times of Israel